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increase in purchase probability from experience with LTC is about half the previously estimated increase
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We examine whether long-term care (LTC) experience helps explain the low demand for longterm care insurance (LTCI). We test if expectations about future informal care receipt,
expectations about inheritance receipt, and LTCI purchase decisions vary between individuals
whose parents or in-laws have used LTC versus those who have not. We find parental use of a
nursing home decreases expectations that one’s children will provide informal care, consistent
with the demonstration effect. Nursing home use by in-laws does not have the same impact,
suggesting that individuals are responding to information gained about their own aging trajectory.
Nursing home use by either a parent or in-law increases LTCI purchase probability by 0.8
percentage points, with no significant difference in response between parents’ and in-laws’ use.
The estimated increase in purchase probability from experience with LTC is about half the
previously estimated increase from tax policy-induced price decreases.

Keywords
long-term care; insurance; informal care; expectations

*We would like to thank participants and discussants at the 2009 iHEA conference, the 2010 AcademyHealth Health Economics

Author Manuscript

Workshop, the 2010 and 2012 ASHEcon conferences, the Aging Workshop at the NBER Summer Institute, Financial Capability
Research Workshop, International Long-Term Care Network, and Boston College for helpful comments. We are especially thankful to
Richard Frank and David Cutler for their insights. We would also like to thank the John A. Hartford Foundation Pilot Studies Grant
through Duke University (Coe and Van Houtven), the Veterans Affairs Health Services Research and Development Merit Review
program [MRP 05-311] (Van Houtven), and the National Institutes of Health [NIH 1R01NR13583] (Coe and Van Houtven) for
funding. Any remaining errors are our own. The opinions and conclusions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not
represent the opinions of Boston College, University of Georgia, University of Washington, NBER, Duke University, or the
Department of Veterans Affairs
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
†
Corresponding Author. Present Address: University of Washington School of Public Health, 1959 NE Pacific Street, Seattle, WA
98195 -7660. nbcoe@uw.edu. Phone: 206-616-8530.
Publisher's Disclaimer: This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our
customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of
the resulting proof before it is published in its final citable form. Please note that during the production process errors may be
discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

Coe et al.

Page 2

Author Manuscript

1 Introduction
Long-term care (LTC) is one of the largest financial risks facing the elderly today, yet very
few people—13 percent of current 65 year olds—insure against the risk. This lack of
insurance coverage has spurred much work that tries to explain this phenomenon
(Finkelstein et al., 2005; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Brown and Finkelstein, 2007;
Brown et al., 2007; Brown and Finkelstein, 2008). It has also spurred public policy into
action, with 24 states and the District of Columbia offering tax breaks for private long-term
care insurance (LTCI) purchases as of 2008 (Goda, 2011). These policy changes, however,
have not led to a widespread increase in coverage (Wiener et al., 2000; Meiners, 2001;
Courtemanche and He, 2009; Goda, 2011). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
also included a now-defunct program, the Community Living and Supported Services
(CLASS) Act, which would have created a new government-run LTCI pool.

Author Manuscript

In other domains of catastrophic insurance, studies have shown that after individuals
experience the insurable risk, they are more likely to purchase insurance against that risk in
the future (Kunreuther et al., 1978; Kunreuther, 1996; McCall et al., 1998; Browne and
Hoyt, 2000; Gallagher, 2014). This response could be explained by behavioral heuristics,
such as an increase in the salience of the risk, or by an increase in information about the
insurable risk.

Author Manuscript

In the LTCI context, lack of experience with LTC could help explain the low demand for
insurance. Experience could help overcome behavioral biases since people tend to dislike
and delay discussions about becoming frail and needing assistance (Sperber et al.,
forthcoming). In addition, experience could fill several potential information gaps in the
LTCI context: the likely need for LTC; the expense entailed in getting such care; the gaps in
one’s existing insurance coverage for LTC; or, one’s family’s willingness to provide
informal care. Any of these sources of incomplete information would lead to lower than
expected LTCI purchases. Previous research has provided evidence of incomplete
information in at least two of these domains. Bacon et al. (1989), Pauly (1990), and AARP
(2006) report that most elderly believe that LTC expenses are covered by Medicare. Further,
AARP (2006) found considerable underestimation of the costs of nursing home care among
individuals age 45 and older. While Brown and Finkelstein (2009) highlight limited
consumer understanding of both the insurance product and the expenditure risk as one of the
top five reasons for low LTCI demand, there has been no empirical testing, to our
knowledge, of the extent to which lack of information depresses LTCI purchase in the
United States.1

Author Manuscript

To evaluate the role experience may play in LTC and LTCI decisions, we exploit variation
between individuals who have someone close to them—a parent or in-law—who needs and
uses LTC and those who do not.2 Individuals who have parents or in-laws who use LTC
may be more aware of the risks and costs. This paper examines how parents’ and in-laws’
use of LTC impacts an adult child’s LTCI purchase decisions. Although we cannot
1Zhou-Richter et al. (2010) assess the role of information among adult children on the demand for LTCI for their parents in Germany.
2While LTC can encompass many types of care arrangements, in the empirical framework, due to data limitations, we limit the term
to only mean two types—informal care from children and nursing home care.
J Health Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 March 01.
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completely disentangle whether the effects are driven by a change in information or
behavioral economics explanations, we exploit variation in the person who needed care
(parent or in-law), the type of care used (nursing home or informal care), and the person
who provided informal care (the adult child him or herself or a sibling) to discern which
explanations may be at play. We also analyze the mechanisms underlying any resulting
change in LTCI holding by examining how expectations about the future change after a
parent or in-law uses LTC. In particular, we analyze how a parent or in-law’s use of LTC
impacts an adult child’s expectations about informal care from children and inheritance
receipt.

Author Manuscript

The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes how experience with LTC via
parents’ or in-laws’ use can affect expectations and LTCI purchase decisions. Section 3
discusses the data and the sample in detail. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy. Section
5 presents the results, in which we examine the impact of parents’ and in-laws’ LTC use on
the adult child’s expectations about informal care and inheritance receipt, and on the
purchase of LTCI, controlling for these expectations. Section 6 concludes that experience
does matter in the decision to purchase LTCI. While the experience effect is slightly smaller
than that of other policies tried, such as decreasing the Medicaid asset limits (Brown et al.,
2007) or the recent tax credits and partnership programs (Goda, 2011), it does not have the
same associated costs to the federal or state budget.

2 How Experience Can Affect Expectations

Author Manuscript

In the specific domain of risk perception and insurance, previous work has shown that
individuals who experience the insurable risk are more likely to purchase insurance against
that risk in the future. Kunreuther et al. (1978) find that individuals who experienced
property damage in a prior natural disaster are more likely to purchase flood insurance.
Similarly, flood insurance purchases increase in areas that experienced a recent flood
(Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Gallagher, 2014). Palm et al. (1990) found an increase in the
perceived need for earthquake insurance after the Loma Prieta earthquake, and Kunreuther
(1996) finds an increase in the demand for insurance following earthquakes more generally.
Coe et al. (2014) find an increase in the stated demand for disability insurance among
individuals who are informed about disability risks.

Author Manuscript

In the LTC literature, some studies have explored how knowledge about LTC or individual
health risks impact LTCI demand behavior. For example, McCall et al. (1998) find that
individuals who have a family member or friend that needs LTC are more likely to purchase
LTCI, and Zhou-Richter et al. (2010) find that German adult children are more likely to
want to buy LTCI for their parents after being informed about the population average risks
and costs of LTC. Brown et al. (2012) find that individuals’ beliefs about the likelihood of
not being able to live independently due to health problems were strongly correlated with
LTCI coverage in the RAND American Life Panel. Meier (1999) formulates a theoretical
model that shows individuals might wait to purchase LTCI to obtain more information about
their own probability of becoming disabled as well as the costs of disability and associated
care. Our paper contributes to this literature by examining how actual experience with LTC
via a parent or in-law’s use of nursing home or informal care impacts LTCI purchase
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behavior, exploiting variation in the relationship to the care recipient, type of care received,
and who provided care.
Disentangling why experience with LTC matters in forming expectations and LTCI
purchase decisions is often difficult with secondary data, but important in order to make
policy recommendations. We explore three potential explanations below: (1) rational
updating; (2) overcoming inertia and increasing salience; and, (3) overreaction to risks.
2.1 Rational Updating

Author Manuscript

The rational expectations model assumes that individuals form expectations using all
available information and make optimal decisions that are based on (and consistent with)
these expectations. When new information is learned, expectations about the future are
updated, typically assumed in a Bayesian manner. The rational expectations model is
consistent with the self-regulation model (Leventhal et al., 1992). The self-regulation model
posits that individual understanding of disease is based on the individual’s rationalizations
about its causes, consequences, timeline, trajectory, prognosis, and their ability to control,
treat, and prevent the illness. Individual understanding is informed by beliefs, experiences,
family, friends, health care practitioners, and the media. Importantly, both positive and
negative experiences or information can alter one’s beliefs, coping strategies, and behavior.

Author Manuscript

The rational expectations model posits that LTC use by parents and parent-in-laws
(hereafter, the G1 generation) could impact one’s knowledge of LTC risks and costs. Under
this framework, we hypothesize that LTC use by the G1 generation will have an information
spillover effect and change the insurance status of their adult children. If individuals are
already fully-informed about the risks they face and their associated costs, then LTC use by
parents or in-laws will have no effect on their own expectations about future use or their
financing plan. However, if individuals learn during their parents’ or in-laws’ LTC spell,
expectations about future care use, lifetime income, and preferences for different types of
care delivery may evolve, and the decision to purchase LTCI to prepare financially for these
future needs may change.
We try to disentangle the type of information that is learned through the G1 generation’s use
of LTC by exploiting across-family variation in who provides care, who receives care, and
the type of care received. For example, helping or watching anyone navigate the LTC
system will make one aware of the complexities they may face during their own aging
process. Thus, information about the aging process and the costs associated with care are
revealed if any individual in the G1 generation uses any type of LTC. Additional
information can be learned as outlined below.

Author Manuscript

•

Relationship to care recipient: Genetic information is revealed through a health
decline of a parent, but not an in-law. Because of the common genetic link, a
parent’s health decline may differentially influence an adult child’s expected need
for future LTC compared to an in-law’s health decline.

•

Type of care received: Whether a parent or in-law receives formal or informal care
could impact an adult child’s expectations or preferences about his or her own
future care needs. The type of care received may provide information about the
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costs of care, the willingness of family to provide informal care, and the ability to
meet LTC needs in an informal setting.
•

Provision of care: As a result of providing informal care to a member of the G1
generation, an individual may experience and learn about caregiver burden, which
has many definitions in the gerontology literature (Zarit et al., 1980) or conversely,
caregiver gain, such as role satisfaction (Tarlow et al., 2004), improved
relationships with a parent (Roth et al., 2005), and the knowledge that one has
fulfilled a familial duty (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004). Providing care to a
parent or in-law may also provide a signal that an adult child expects his or her own
children to do the same (i.e. the demonstration effect) (Stark, 1995; Cox and Stark,
2005). We hypothesize that an individual who provides informal care will learn
more about this aspect of LTC than non-care providing adult children.

Author Manuscript

One complicating factor is that parents’ or in-laws’ use of LTC might impact one’s lifetime
income expectations through changing the size or the probability of receiving a bequest;
thus, we also examine how expectations about inheritance receipt vary with LTC use in the
G1 generation. For example, a G1 member receiving informal care might change
expectations about who gets the bequest if the exchange motive is operative (Bernheim et
al., 1985; Norton and Van Houtven, 2006), while formal care use may impact the expected
size of the bequest, particularly if such care is paid out-of-pocket.

Author Manuscript

Further, we examine whether there are direct or indirect effects of the G1 generation’s use of
LTC on how adult children plan to pay for their future care needs by analyzing their
decision to purchase private LTCI. The hypothesized changes in the perceived need for
insurance described above are consistent with Bayesian updating within a rational
expectations framework (Viscusi, 1991). In other words, individuals gain new information
from the G1 generation’s use of LTC and update their own expectations, which could result
in a change in behavior in the form of purchasing LTCI.
2.2 Overcoming Inertia and Increasing Salience
Changes in expectations and LTCI purchase decisions among individuals with more
experience with the insurable risk may also be consistent with models proposed in
behavioral economics, based on the psychology literature. Two likely concepts at play in the
LTC and LTCI context are inertia and salience.

Author Manuscript

•

Inertia: When faced with the difficult calculation of determining whether and how
much LTCI is needed, individuals may simply follow the status quo from a
previous decision or avoid making a decision altogether. In this case, the status quo
is non-purchase, and could lead to lower levels of insurance rates than predicted to
be optimal from a rational expectations standpoint. Having someone in the G1
generation use LTC may be a precipitating event to end the inertia.

•

Salience and availability bias: “Salience refers to the phenomenon that when one’s
attention is differentially directed to one portion of the environment rather than to
others, the information contained in that portion will receive disproportionate
weighting in subsequent judgments” (Taylor and Thompson, 1982). Having
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someone in the G1 generation use LTC may increase the salience of LTC and LTCI
decisions for the adult child. The behavioral economics literature has noted that
salient risks (even low-probability ones) are often given excessive weight and result
in excessive reactions by individuals. Closely related, availability bias means
individuals base the probability of an event on the ease with which instances of the
event can be brought to mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Thus, changes in
expectations and LTCI purchase in response to LTC use by the G1 generation may
reflect adult children putting excessive weight on LTC risks because they are
salient or can be brought to mind easily, rather than a rational updating of the
information set.
2.3 Changing Risk Perception

Author Manuscript

Kahneman and Tversky (1979) observe that people have “limited ability to comprehend and
evaluate extreme probabilities.” Indeed, the literature has found that individuals tend to
overestimate low-probability events. Coe and Webb (2009) suggest that people tend to
overestimate their probability of receiving an inheritance; however, previous work such as
Lindrooth et al. (2000) and Taylor et al. (2005) suggests that average nursing home
utilization predictions from individuals in the early years of the AHEAD data are fairly
accurate compared with their actual nursing home usage 5 to 7 years later. Another
phenomenon concerning probability perception is the tendency to overreact to fearsome
risks and overestimate their frequency (Sunstein and Zeckhauser, 2011). Thus, changes in
expectations and LTCI purchase following LTC use by the G1 generation may capture adult
children excessively reacting to LTC risks.

Author Manuscript

It is difficult to separately identify the mechanisms underlying behavior changes following
experience with LTC using secondary data sources that do not specifically ask why
individuals changed their expectations or decision to purchase LTCI (or without a full
parameterization of the decision-making model). However, by exploiting variation in the
relationship to the care recipient, the type of care received, and who provided care, we might
take some steps to disentangle the different explanations. For example, within a married
household with shared decision-making, it is difficult to use the salience argument to explain
large differential responses to in-laws using LTC and parents using LTC. We generally
discuss our findings within the context of the rational expectations and Bayesian learning
framework, but we acknowledge that for the most part, we cannot completely rule out or
disentangle the role of the behavioral tendencies and non-learning responses outlined above.

3 Data
Author Manuscript

We use data from the 1998 through 2006 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
In 1992, the HRS sampled the non-institutionalized 51 to 61 year old U.S. population, and
respondents have been followed every two years. We limit the years of data due to question
differences across years. We start with the 1998 wave due to the inconsistent definition of
LTCI in the survey and other key variables prior (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006), and end
in 2006 due to the lack of questions about inheritance expectations in later years.

J Health Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 March 01.
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We create a respondent-level dataset consisting of respondents from the original HRS cohort
and their spouses. We limit our analysis to individuals over the age of 50. Given we are
interested in expectations about informal care from children, an individual has to have at
least one living child to be included in the sample. Since we are interested in LTCI purchase,
an individual must not have LTCI in the prior survey wave and must be able to pass the
LTCI underwriting screening as of the prior wave (i.e. no IADLs or ADLs and no recent
strokes).3,4 Table A1 in the Appendix details our sample restrictions. Our final estimation
samples consists of 26,979 person-wave observations, representing 8,349 unique
individuals.
3.2 Variables

Author Manuscript

First, we analyze how G1 LTC use impacts expectations about informal care and inheritance
receipt. Regarding future informal care expectations, the HRS asks, “Suppose in the future,
you needed help with basic personal care activities like eating or dressing. Do you have
relatives or friends (besides your [husband/wife/partner]) who would be willing and able to
help you over a long period of time?” If the respondent says yes, he or she is asked, “What is
the relationship to you of that person or persons?” Respondents are allowed to indicate
multiple options from among a variety of people listed. If respondents include “child/childin-law” in the follow-up, we code them as expecting children to provide informal care in the
future.

Author Manuscript

Having a parent use LTC could impact expectations about future inheritance receipt (either
the amount or the likelihood of receiving one), and consequently impact one’s expectations
about lifetime wealth. Such changes could subsequently impact the financial planning that
he or she may need to undertake to handle LTC expenses in the future, including the choice
between self-insuring and having private LTCI. The HRS asks, “What are the chances you
will receive an inheritance during the next 10 years?” Individuals can respond with a
probability between 0 and 100, which we rescale to be between 0 and 1.5

Author Manuscript

Second, we test the influence of the G1 generation’s use of LTC on LTCI purchase,
controlling for the adult child’s expectations. Regarding LTCI, the HRS asks, “Not
including government programs, do you now have any long term care insurance which
specifically covers nursing home care for a year or more or any part of personal or medical
care in your home?” Individuals can respond yes or no. We define purchase to mean an
individual answered yes to the LTCI question in the current survey wave but answered no in
the prior wave. As mentioned earlier, we examine purchase only among individuals healthy
enough to pass the underwriting screening as of the prior survey wave.

3IADLs are instrumental activities of daily living which include food preparation, housekeeping, managing finances, taking
medication, among other activities. ADLs are activities of daily living, which including bathing, dressing, eating, toileting, and
transferring (walking).
4We focus on LTCI purchase and not LTCI coverage to ensure the potential information gained from G LTC use occurs before the
1
LTCI purchase.
5In 2006, the question wording changed to “What are the chances that you (or your [husband/wife/partner]) will receive an inheritance
during the next 10 years?”
J Health Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 March 01.
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The primary explanatory measures of interest are whether parents and in-laws received LTC
and which type of care. We can identify informal care and nursing home care use of the G1
generation. The HRS asks respondents where each of their parents and in-laws currently
lives, with one of the possible responses being in a nursing home. In addition, if a parent or
in-law has passed away since the prior survey wave, the HRS asks respondents whether that
parent or in-law ever lived in a nursing home. We categorize parents or in-laws who
currently live or ever lived in a nursing home as having utilized nursing home care.6

Author Manuscript

In order to measure informal care provided to the G1 generation, the HRS asks each
respondent if he or she and his or her spouse spent a total of 100 or more hours in the last
two years helping each parent or in-law with “basic personal activities like dressing, eating,
and bathing.” The survey then asks who was helped and how many hours of care the
respondent, and separately his or her spouse provided. The survey also asks which siblings
and sibling in-laws, if any, provide help with these tasks.7

4 Empirical Strategy
In order to examine the effect of LTC use of the G1 generation on the adult child’s
expectations about informal care provision from his or her children, we estimate the
following equation using a logit model:
(1)

where ExpectICt is an indicator variable for whether individual i at time t expects that his or
her children will be willing to provide informal care in the future.

Author Manuscript
Author Manuscript

Ait is a vector of LTC received by parents and in-laws, measuring if LTC was ever provided
before or during time t. In our estimation, we consider three separate vectors of LTC
received by the G1 generation to delineate across types of information provided: (1) Any
parent or in-law receives any type of LTC; (2) Any parent or in-law receives nursing home
care versus any parent or in-law receives informal care; (3) Own parent uses nursing home
care; own parent receives informal care from the respondent; own parent receives informal
care from the respondent’s siblings, and the three in-law correlates. Hit is a vector of the
adult child’s health information, included to capture risk factors for future LTC needs. This
vector includes the number of ADLs, the number of IADLs, an indicator for a low cognition
score, the number of chronic conditions, an indicator for incontinence problems, and
indicators for whether the adult child has previously used nursing home, home health, or
informal care in the past two years. ICit represents the potential informal care network
available to the respondent (besides a spouse) including the number of male and female
children, the number of living siblings, the number of co-resident children, and the number
of children living within 10 miles (excluding co-resident children). The individual-level
characteristics included in the vector Zit are age, age squared, gender, race, and education

6The HRS does not contain information about formal home health care use of parents or in-laws. As a result, unfortunately, we cannot
analyze how G1 generation use of formal home health care affects expectations or LTCI purchase.
7We do not include help with chores, errands, or transportation in our definition of informal care in order to keep the definition
consistent between respondents and siblings, for whom we only know about personal care provision.
J Health Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 March 01.
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categories (less than high school, high school, and at least some college) for the respondent
and his or her mother and father. We also include an indicator for being married, being
divorced, and an interaction term between gender and divorced, as well as an indicator for
whether all parents and in-laws are deceased. Fit is a vector of financial information. This
includes annual financial wealth quartiles, annual housing wealth quartiles, whether the
respondent and his or her spouse have assets in a trust, whether the respondent has a will
that benefits his or her children, and whether the children hold the deed to the house. Last,
we include survey wave indicators, wt. The standard errors are clustered at the individual
level to account for repeated observations.
To analyze the effect of LTC use of the G1 generation on the adult child’s reported
probability of receiving an inheritance, we estimate the following fractional logit model:

Author Manuscript

(2)

where ExpectInherit is individual i’s self-reported probability at time t of receiving an
inheritance, taking on values from 0 to 1 inclusive, and
(3)

Ait, Hit, ICit, Zit, Fit, and wt are as defined above. The fractional logit model developed by
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) accounts for the fact that the dependent variable is a
proportion and can take on values of 0 or 1.

Author Manuscript

We then examine the impact of the G1 generation receiving LTC on LTCI purchase, adding
expectations about future informal care and inheritance receipt to the regression in order to
disentangle the direct effect of experience on LTCI purchase from the indirect effects that
operate via changes in expectations. Therefore, we estimate the following logit model:
(4)

where LTCIit is an indicator variable for reporting having an LTCI policy in period t
conditional on not having one in period t – 1. Ait, ExpectICit, ExpectInherit, Hit, ICit, Zit, Fit,
and wt are as defined above.

5 Results
Author Manuscript

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics from our estimation sample. About 50 percent of
the sample expect their children to provide informal care in the future. The average expected
probability of receiving an inheritance in the future is 15 percent. Approximately 5 percent
of the sample ever purchases LTCI during the period we consider. Almost 70 percent had
some interaction with the LTC system via their parents or in-laws. About 52 percent of the
G1 generation used a nursing home while 42 percent used informal care (these are not
mutually exclusive options).
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The average age in the sample is almost 65. There are slightly more females than males, and
74 percent of the sample is married. Very few of the respondents have already used LTC
themselves—likely reflecting the sample selection criteria of being able pass the LTCI
underwriting screening. Not even 1 percent of the sample has used informal or nursing home
care, but almost 7 percent has used formal home health care in some capacity.8
On average, the sample has many potential informal care providers. As mentioned earlier,
almost three-quarters of the sample is married, and individuals have almost 3 living siblings,
2 sons, and 2 daughters, on average. In addition, one of the respondent’s children lives
within 10 miles, on average.

Author Manuscript

Table 2 presents the marginal effects and standard errors from the logit model estimating the
impact of G1 LTC use on whether an individual expects his or her children will provide
informal care in the future.9 Column 1 presents the marginal effects from the model
estimating the effect of any G1 member using any type of LTC. Column 2 breaks down G1
LTC use between nursing home and informal care. Column 3 presents the results when G1
LTC use is broken down into six categories: parent uses nursing home care, respondent
provides informal care to parent, respondent’s sibling provides informal care to parent, and
the three in-law correlates.

Author Manuscript

We find evidence that an individual’s expectations about informal care from their children
or children-in-law are impacted by nursing home use of the G1 generation, and this effect is
driven by the respondent’s own parent’s nursing home use. If the respondent’s parent uses a
nursing home, he or she is 2.7 percentage points less likely to expect his or her child will
provide care in the future. This result is consistent with the demonstration effect. If an
individual’s parent uses a nursing home, that individual has not signaled that he or she
expects or prefers to receive informal care from his or her children, which may decrease
expectations about future informal care receipt. This result is also consistent with some of
the behavioral responses outlined above. For example, if the parent’s use of nursing home
care is salient or can be brought to mind easily, individuals might give disproportionate
weight to the probability of using nursing home care in the future, and consequently report
that they do not expect informal care. However, it is harder to use salience or risk perception
as an explanation for the large difference in effects of in-law versus parental use of nursing
home care on informal care expectations.

Author Manuscript

Next, we explore the effect of G1 LTC use on the self-reported probability of receiving an
inheritance. Marginal effects and standard errors from the fractional logit model are
presented in Table 3. We find that the direction of the effect depends on the type of care the
G1 generation utilized. After an individual’s parent uses nursing home care, he or she
decreases expectations about future inheritance receipt by 2.9 percentage points. If a
respondent provides informal care to his or her own parent, he or she increases inheritance

8While controlling for prior LTC use seems logical when estimating expectations about future informal care, using LTC oneself likely
informs individuals about LTC costs and probabilities above and beyond the information set learned from the G1 generation receiving
LTC. We have rerun our baseline equations eliminating those with their own experience with LTC, and we find quantitatively similar
results which we discuss later.
9The coefficients and marginal effects of the control variables are largely as expected. Full results are available upon request.
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expectations by 1.4 percentage points, but if a sibling-in-law provides care to the
respondent’s in-law, he or she decreases inheritance expectations by 1.7 percentage points.
The decrease in expected inheritance receipt after a parent uses nursing home care may be
explained by the child observing that there is less wealth to inherit as a result of the parent
spending down to qualify for Medicaid or to pay for nursing home care out-of-pocket. The
finding that informal care provided to a parent by the respondent increases the likelihood of
receiving an inheritance, while sibling-in-law provision of informal care to an in-law
decreases that likelihood suggests that individuals believe an exchange or bequest motive is
operative (i.e. that individuals who provide care will be rewarded with a bequest).

Author Manuscript
Author Manuscript

We analyze the effect of LTC use among the G1 generation on LTCI purchase, controlling
for informal care and inheritance expectations, to examine if there is a direct effect of
experience on LTCI purchase. Results are shown in Table 4. In Column 2, we find having a
G1 member use a nursing home increases the probability of LTCI purchase by 0.9
percentage points. In particular, having a parent use a nursing home increases the probability
of LTCI purchase by 0.8 percentage points and having an in-law use a nursing home
increases the probability of purchase by 0.6 percentage points, though the latter effect is
marginally significant (p = 0.053). Given that these effects are not statistically different from
each other, our results suggest that by observing someone in the G1 generation receive
nursing home care, the adult child changes his or her financial planning strategy to handle
future LTC expenses. This change might be driven by information learned about the costs of
nursing home care and the lack of public insurance coverage for nursing home expenses. It
is also consistent with behavioral responses. If individuals typically follow the status quo of
non-purchase, seeing a G1 member use nursing home care may be the impetus to end that
inertia. It is important to note that informal care does not trigger the same response. This
could be due to different information learned through informal caregiving versus nursing
home care regarding formal care expenses. Further, it is suggestive that the increase in LTCI
purchase probability is not only driven by an overreaction to low-probability risks.
Interestingly, we find individuals who expect their children will provide informal care for
them in the future are 0.6 percentage points more likely to purchase LTCI. While this result
is unexpected, it might reflect that some individuals who know or expect that their children
will provide care want to avoid burdening their children as diseases progress and purchase
LTCI. For example, qualitative work suggests that parents want their children to provide
“support but not be burdened” should the need for LTC arise (Sperber et al., forthcoming).
This result may also reflect that individuals who expect their children to provide informal
care have already had discussions about future LTC alternatives and are relatively more
forward-looking, leading them to purchase LTCI.

Author Manuscript

We find inheritance expectations have no significant effect on the probability of purchasing
LTCI. Given the median inheritance in the U.S. is less than one year of average nursing
home costs, this non-result is not surprising (Wolff and Gittleman, 2014).
Since G1 nursing home use decreases expectations about informal care receipt, and these
expectations influence LTCI purchase, we run a simple counterfactual exercise to estimate
the total effect G1 nursing home use has on LTCI purchase probability. We use the
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estimated models to predict a counterfactual case where no one had a member of the G1
generation use a nursing home and then a separate counterfactual where everyone had a G1
generation member who received nursing home care.10 We perform the counterfactual on
the informal care and inheritance expectations equations, and then on the LTCI purchase
equation accounting for the expectations as well as the direct effects of G1 nursing home use
on LTCI purchase. This counterfactual exercise suggests that having either a parent or an inlaw use nursing home care increases LTCI purchase probability by 0.7 to 0.8 percentage
points. One interpretation of this finding is that most of the information learned through
these experiences is about LTC more generally. This information could be about the costs of
LTC, the incomplete insurance for these costs, or about general aging processes. Given that
the effect is somewhat similar regardless of the relationship with the G1 care recipient, new
information about one’s own genetic predisposition in the aging process may play a role but
not an especially large one in the decision to purchase LTCI. Alternatively, this finding
could indicate that having a G1 member use nursing home care provides the impetus to take
action and to buy LTCI. Individuals without this “reminder” may delay, possibly to the point
where they no longer meet the screening criteria for coverage.
5.1 Heterogeneity

Author Manuscript
Author Manuscript

Brown et al. (2007) and Brown and Finkelstein (2008) highlight that Medicaid, while
means-tested, provides considerable insurance coverage for LTC risks for those in the lower
portion of the wealth distribution, and thus the demand for LTCI may be crowded out by
public insurance. Thus, wealth may be an important source of heterogeneity in the responses
to learning about LTC. To test for this heterogeneity, we reestimate the expectations and
LTCI equations only on the top half of the wealth distribution. In Table 5, we present results
for the more detailed breakdown of G1 LTC use.11 We find the impact of G1 LTC use on
informal care expectations is similar to that of the baseline. While we again find that a
parent using a nursing home decreases an adult child’s self-reported probability of receiving
an inheritance, we no longer find the respondent’s provision of care to a parent or a siblingin-law’s provision of care to the respondent’s in-law significantly impacts that probability.
Instead, we find siblings providing care to the respondent’s parent increases the respondent’s
inheritance expectations. Individuals may believe the exchange motive is operative, but
informal care provided by siblings might impact the relative size of the expected inheritance
between siblings, not the probability of receiving an inheritance.12 Similar to the baseline
results, nursing home care received by the respondent’s parent increases the probability the
respondent purchases LTCI. We also find the impact of an in-law’s use of nursing home
care more significantly increases the probability of purchasing LTCI compared to the
baseline estimates. Seeing a parent (or in-law) use nursing home care may provide important
information about the costs and insurance coverage of such care, which may be especially
important for relatively wealthy individuals who are less likely to qualify for Medicaid and

10More specifically, we separately predict two counterfactual cases where no one versus everyone: (1) had a parent use nursing home
care; (2) had an in-law use nursing home care.
11The results for the broader breakdowns of G LTC use are available upon request.
1
12It is important to note that we only observe expectations about receiving an inheritance, not about the amount of the inheritance, and
thus the identity of the informal care provider may be less important for the extensive margin expectation. Previous work suggests that
parents often leave the exact same amounts to children in a will, regardless of informal care provision (McGarry, 1999).
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more able to afford the LTCI premiums, prompting them to purchase LTCI. Interestingly, if
a respondent provided informal care to an in-law, he or she has a significantly lower
probability of purchasing LTCI. Providing care for an in-law might signal that the individual
places heavy weight on reciprocity and familial responsibility norms, and thus, has a
preference for informal care over formal care, leading to a decreased probability of LTCI
purchase. Those with relatively more wealth who especially value responsibility norms and
are altruistic may be more willing to self-insure against LTC in the hopes of leaving a large
incidental bequest should LTC go unused. Lockwood (2013) finds bequest motives, where
bequests are assumed to be luxury goods, increase savings and decrease LTCI purchases,
especially for individuals in the top half of the wealth distribution.

Author Manuscript

We also explore heterogeneity in the effects by the age at which the G1 generation member
first received LTC. We create an indicator variable for the G1 member being 80 years old or
younger versus older than 80 years old when care was first received.13 We interact this
indicator variable with our measures of G1 LTC use. Results are available upon request but
we provide a discussion of our findings for the more detailed breakdown of G1 LTC use
below.

Author Manuscript

Overall, we find fairly consistent effects based on the age at which a parent or in-law starts
receiving care. We find that if a parent was over 80 years old when he or she first received
nursing home care, the adult child is 3.2 percentage points less likely to expect his or her
own children will provide informal care in the future, compared to no significant effect if the
parent was young. However, the effects are not statistically different from each other.
Inheritance expectations decrease regardless of the age at which the G1 member uses a
nursing home or the age at which sibling-in-laws provide informal care to in-laws. These
estimated effects are slightly larger for care that began when the parent was 80 years old or
younger, although the difference between the effects is statistically insignificant. Intuitively,
a parent who initiates LTC at a “younger” age has the potential for a longer care episode and
more expenses, decreasing the wealth available to leave as a bequest. We find no significant
age-related heterogeneity in the effect of parents using a nursing home on LTCI purchase
decisions.

Author Manuscript

There are a few cases where we find evidence of heterogeneity of effects based on the age of
LTC onset. For example, a respondent is more likely to expect an inheritance if his or her
sibling provided care to an “older” parent, compared to no significant effect if the sibling
provides care to a “young” parent. This finding is consistent with the idea that the expected
care episode might be relatively short in duration, and thus there will be financial resources
left to disperse. Regarding LTCI purchase, we find when a respondent provides informal
care that started when the parent was “young,” the respondent is 1.4 percentage points less
likely to purchase LTCI. This finding is consistent with the idea that informal care provision
to younger parents represents more commitment to informal care and thus less demand for
LTCI. It is also consistent with a financial drain story—providing care to younger parents,
with potentially a longer disability spell, could make individuals unable to afford LTCI.

13We selected 80 years old as the cutoff because that was the median age at which LTC began for the G generation in our sample.
1
The average age was 79.5 years old.
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Further work eliciting individual expectations about length of care spell and the financial
burdens of care provision would be needed to tease out these explanations.
5.2 Specification and Robustness Checks
To address the concern that families with G1 LTC use are different from families without
any G1 LTC use, we rerun the regressions only on the subsample of individuals who have
someone in the G1 generation who accessed LTC at some point. Thus, the identifying
variation comes from pre- and post-G1 LTC use among LTC-using families. The results are
quite robust, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to the baseline estimates.14

Author Manuscript

One may have concerns about the selection of control variables. In particular, prior LTC use
of the respondent may be endogenous with respect to the expectations we consider as well as
LTCI purchase, which would bias our results. We reestimate all the specifications excluding
individuals who have previously used LTC themselves.15 While we still find a parent’s use
of nursing home care increases the individual’s probability of purchasing LTCI, the
marginal effect is slightly smaller and less precise than in the baseline. Overall, however, the
results are robust to the exclusion of individuals who used LTC themselves.

Author Manuscript

Finally, one might be concerned about the age criteria used to select the sample. We have
rerun all models restricting the sample to individuals age 65 and older, a “typical” age at
which individuals may retire and begin LTC planning.16 Due to a drop in sample size, some
of the effects of G1 LTC use on expectations and LTCI purchase are less precise, but are of
similar estimated size relative to the baseline results. Consistent with the baseline results, we
again find a parent’s nursing home use significantly decreases expectations about future
informal care receipt and inheritance receipt, and increases the probability of purchasing
LTCI. Results are available upon request.

6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effects of experiencing parents’ and in-laws’ use of LTC on an
individual’s expectations about informal care and inheritance receipt as well as the
probability of purchasing LTCI. We find that nursing home use has the largest and most
significant impact on both individual expectations and LTCI purchase decisions. We find
that individuals are more likely to purchase LTCI if a close relative has used a nursing
home, even after controlling for expectations about the future. Supporting the evidence of
Medicaid crowd-out highlighted in Brown et al. (2007) and Brown and Finkelstein (2008),
the estimated effects of LTC experience are stronger among the wealthier half of the sample,
who are less likely to be affected by Medicaid coverage for nursing homes.

Author Manuscript

14The results are available upon request.
15The results are available upon request.
16One benefit of this sample age restriction is that we can use the HRS question concerning individuals’ assessment of their
probability of entering a nursing home in the next 5 years, which is only consistently asked across waves to individuals age 65 and
over. We chose not to include this expectation in our baseline analysis because it would have imposed a substantial sample restriction
and severely limited the age ranges for which we could analyze LTCI purchase behavior. However, when we repeat our analysis on
the older individuals, with or without the nursing home entry expectation as an outcome and as an expectation that could affect LTCI
purchase, we find qualitatively similar results to those of the baseline, although we lose some significance due to the drop in sample
size.
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Our findings are interesting in light of the standard asymmetric information (AI) model and
work by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) on LTCI. Standard AI models predict that in
equilibrium there will be a positive correlation between the amount of insurance purchased
and the occurrence of the risky event (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Dionne et al., 2001;
Chiappori et al., 2006). Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) posit that two types of individuals
may lead to violations in the standard model: individuals with private information that they
are a higher risk than the insurance company expects (for example, due to unobserved health
status); or individuals with private information that have a strong taste for insurance and are
lower risk than the insurance company expects (i.e. risk averse individuals). Our analysis
suggests that LTC use of parents and in-laws, particularly nursing home care, makes
individuals change their expectations about their own use of LTC in the future, as well as the
uptake of LTCI. This type of information has not been explicitly considered in the AI
models.

Author Manuscript

Overall, the total estimated effect of a parent using a nursing home on LTCI purchase is
about half of the previously estimated effects of potential policy levers, such as having all
states lower their Medicaid asset test to the federal minimum (Brown et al., 2007), or the
effects of state tax deductions on LTCI holding (Goda, 2011). However, unlike these
policies, providing the information or the impetus to action that is equivalent to having a
parent or in-law use a nursing home has no direct impact on state or federal revenues. Since
the CLASS Act has failed, policymakers could look to information campaigns as potentially
cheaper interventions if increasing LTCI coverage is a priority.

Appendix
Table A1

Author Manuscript

Sample Restrictions
# Person-wave observations
All HRS respondents in waves 1998-2006

48,404

Age 50 and over

47,241

Has living children

44,745

Informal care and inheritance expectations questions answered

37,298

Did not have LTCI in the prior wave

32,001

Healthy enough to pass underwriting screening as of the prior wave

27,066

LTCI question answered

27,066

Full set of control variables available

26,979

Author Manuscript
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Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Average

Outcomes: Expectations and LTCI
Expect informal care from children/children-in-law

0.505

Probability of receiving inheritance

0.151

Purchased LTCI

0.055

G1 Long-Term Care Measures

Author Manuscript

Any G1 received LTC

0.689

Any G1 received nursing home care

0.520

Any G1 received informal care

0.422

Parent used nursing home care

0.343

In-law used nursing home care

0.298

Parent received informal care from respondent

0.156

Parent received informal care from respondent’s sibling(s)

0.219

In-law received informal care from respondent

0.084

In-law received informal care from respondent’s sibling(s)-in-law

0.176

Health Variables

Author Manuscript

# of ADLs

0.073

# of IADLs

0.021

Low cognition

0.067

Incontinent

0.148

# of chronic conditions

1.504

Ever used informal care

0.009

Ever used formal home health care

0.067

Ever used nursing home care

0.008

Financial Variables
Has a trust

0.080

Has children on deed to house

0.033

Has children on will

0.488

Demographic Variables
Age

64.713

Female

0.581

Married

0.736

Divorced

0.123

Non-white

0.148

Education:

Author Manuscript

Less than high school

0.227

High school graduate

0.372

Some college

0.401

Mother’s education:
Less than high school

0.539
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Variable

Average
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High school graduate

0.278

Some college

0.104

Missing

0.078

Father’s education:
Less than high school

0.553

High school graduate

0.226

Some college

0.114

Missing

0.107

All parents and in-laws deceased

0.548

Informal Care Network Variables

Author Manuscript

# of living siblings

2.850

# of male children

1.850

# of female children

1.773

# of co-resident children

0.293

# of children within 10 miles

0.982

# of person-wave observations

26,979
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Author Manuscript
J Health Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 March 01.

Coe et al.

Page 20

Table 2
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Expectations about Future Informal Care Provision by Children
I

II

III

-0.0166* (0.00888)

Any G1 used LTC

-0.0223*** (0.00848)

Any G1 used nursing home care
Any G1 used informal care

-0.00586 (0.00851)

Parent used nursing home care

-0.0267*** (0.00885)

In-law used nursing home care

-0.00378 (0.00943)

R provided care to parent

0.0154 (0.0124)

Sibling provided care to parent

0.00122 (0.0111)

R provided care to in-law

-0.0197 (0.0156)

Sibling-in-law provided care to R’s in-law

0.00104 (0.0118)

Author Manuscript

Observations

26,979

26,979

26,979

NOTES: R denotes the HRS respondent. Marginal effects are shown and the standard errors of those marginal effects are in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level. Significance levels:
*

p < 0.1,

**
p < 0.05,
***

p < 0.01.
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Author Manuscript
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Table 3
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Expectations about Future Inheritance Receipt
I
Any G1 used LTC

II

III

-0.00525 (0.00522)

Any G1 used nursing home care

-0.0116** (0.00502)

Any G1 used informal care

-0.00179 (0.00493)

Parent used nursing home care

-0.0294*** (0.00524)

In-law used nursing home care

0.00681 (0.00564)

R provided care to parent

0.0142** (0.00708)

Sibling provided care to parent

0.00960 (0.00631)

R provided care to in-law

0.0116 (0.00867)
-0.0171*** (0.00632)

Sibling-in-law provided care to R’s in-law

Author Manuscript

Observations

26,979

26,979

26,979

NOTES: R denotes the HRS respondent. Marginal effects are shown and the standard errors of those marginal effects are in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level. Significance levels:
*

p < 0.1,

**
p < 0.05,
***

p < 0.01

Author Manuscript
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Table 4

Author Manuscript

Long-Term Care Insurance Purchase
I
Any G1 used LTC

II

III

0.00302 (0.00315)
0.00884*** (0.00299)

Any G1 used nursing home care
Any G1 used informal care

-0.00425 (0.00297)

Parent used nursing home care

0.00837*** (0.00319)

In-law used nursing home care

0.00631* (0.00326)

R provided care to parent

-0.00422 (0.00429)

Sibling provided care to parent

-0.000931 (0.00401)

R provided care to in-law

-0.00856 (0.00523)

Sibling-in-law provided care to R’s in-law

-0.000329 (0.00409)

Author Manuscript

Informal care expectations
Inheritance expectations
Observations

0.00591** (0.00290)

0.00604** (0.00290)

0.00610** (0.00290)

0.00320 (0.00469)

0.00347 (0.00469)

0.00399 (0.00471)

26,979

26,979

26,979

NOTES: R denotes the HRS respondent. Marginal effects are shown and the standard errors of those marginal effects are in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level. Significance levels:
*

p < 0.1,

**
p < 0.05,
***

p < 0.01
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Table 5

Author Manuscript

Expectation and Long-Term Care Insurance Purchase Results for Top Half of Wealth Distribution
Informal Care Expectations

Inheritance Expectations

LTCI Purchase

Parent used nursing home care

-0.0301** (0.0118)

-0.0330*** (0.00795)

0.0121** (0.00486)

In-law used nursing home care

-0.0166 (0.0122)

0.00408 (0.00813)

0.0103** (0.00493)

R provided care to parent

0.0232 (0.0167)

0.00674 (0.0105)

-0.00680 (0.00656)

Sibling provided care to parent

-0.0127 (0.0153)

0.0269*** (0.0101)

0.00239 (0.00645)

R provided care to in-law

-0.0277 (0.0197)

0.0169 (0.0124)

-0.0194*** (0.00735)

Sibling-in-law provided care to R’s in-law

-0.0152 (0.0152)

-0.0121 (0.00959)

0.00372 (0.00649)

Informal care expectations

0.00274 (0.00463)

Inheritance expectations

0.0116 (0.00704)

Observations

13,493

13,493

13,493

Author Manuscript

NOTES: R denotes the HRS respondent. Marginal effects are shown and the standard errors of those marginal effects are in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level. Significance levels:
*

p < 0.1,

**
p < 0.05,
***

p < 0.01
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